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A RE-EXAMINATION OF BRAZILIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN THE 1960s 
Gary S. Fields 
One of the most interesting and controversial.cases of economic de­
velopment has been that of Brazil. Over the decade of the 1960s, the real 
rate of economic growth was 79%, with annual rates approaching 10% in the 
latter few years. After allowing for a high population growth rate, the 
rate of growth of real income per capita over the decade was still 32%, among 
the highest in the Third World. On this basis, the Brazilian case has been 
widely heralded as an "economic mtracle". 
More recently however challenges have arisen. One group of analysts has 
looked with disfavor upon social policies which prevailed over the period, 
particularly following the rise to power in 1964 of the military government. 
A second group has examined the distributional question of who received the 
benefits of this growth, and have found greater income inequality according 
to conventional measures. These observations have caused many students of 
development to ask whether the high rate of aggregate growth in Brazil was 
worth the apparent social and distributional costs. As a result, there is 
at present widespread disagreement about the desirability of taking Brazilian 
economic and social policies as a model for other developing countries to 
follow, and it is probably fair to say that the Brazilian experience is no 
longer regarded as "miraculous." 
The purµose of this paper is to re-examine one of these two challenges, 
namelv, the distributional impact of Brazilian economic growth during the 
1960s. The principal conclusion I reach is that it is possible to arrive 
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at a quite different interpretation. I hope to show that the poor in Brazil 
benefited rather substantially in economic terms from a decade of rapid 
economic growth. Estimates presented below indicate that average real incomes 
among families defined as poor by Brazilian standards increased by more than 
60% while the comparable figure for non-poor families is around 25-30%. How-
ever, since non-poor families receive incomes which are much greater than 
those of poor families, the bulk of the growth of national income over the 
decaqe was received by families whose incomes placed them above the official 
poverty standard. These findings may be evaluated differently by various 
observers, depending on whether they have in mind an absolute or a relative 
definition of poverty. It would seem clear from these results, though, that 
it would be incorrect to say either that (1) in achieving a high rate of 
economic growth in Brazil the rich got ahsolutely richer while the poor got 
absolutely poorer, or (2) the incomes of poor families increased at a slower 
percentage rate than those of non-poor families. 
One word of caution. In presenting these results on the distributional 
question, I am ~ot taking a position in favor of the social measures adopted 
:in Brazil. Conventional economics gives virtually no guidance on how to 
weigh the measures used to achieve economic growth against the actual de­
velop-ncnt realized, and we are left to relv on personal judgments concerning 
matters of social justice. Personally, I doubt that in the Brazilian case 
the m~ans 1ustify the ends, but this is a value judgment, not a scientific 
conc.1'.Jsion. 
I. lhsic Results and the Customary Interpretation 
The pioneering study of economic growth and the size distribution of 
income in Brazil over the decade of the 1960s is that of Fishlow (1972). 
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The basic data are reported in Table 1. 
Looking first at the level of income, the mean income among the 
economically active population in constant U.S. dollars increased from $513 
1in 1960 to $679 in 1970, a real increase of 32%. ~ot shown in the table is 
the fact_that growth rates of 9% per annum had been realized during the 
latter 1960s (between 1967 and 1970) and have continued thereafter. This 
is the essence of the Brazilian "economic miracle." 
At first glance, the data on income distribution seem to tell another 
story, however. We see that the upper 3.2 percent of the economically active 
population received 27% of the income in 1960; by 1970, their share had 
risen to more than 32%. In addition, the Gini coefficient rose from 0.59 to 
0,63, seemingly implying a less even income distribution. A second study of 
Brazilian growth over the same period, by Langoni (1972), arrives at basically 
2the same changes in the income distribution. 
Fishlow's interpretation of these is the following: "The conclusion that 
inequality has increased over the course of the decade accordingly seems 
correct, if lamentable."3 This qualitative result---of a "worsening" income 
distribution in Brazil--has been widely accepted. 4 
1This is the percentage increase of "uncorrected incomes" for the 
"total economically active population," the only comparison possible with 
Fishlow's data. 
2Using slightly different definitions than Fishlow, Langoni found a rise 
in the Gini coefficient from 0.49 to 0,56, a falling share of national income 
received by each of the four lowest quintiles, and a rising share received 
by the richest 5% (from 27.9% to 34.9% of national income). 
3Fishlow (1972, p. 399). 
4See, for instance, the work of Cline (1973) and Figueroa and Weisskoff (1974) 
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Contrary to the customary interpretation, I wish to suggest that the 
Brazilian data are capable of telling a different story. This is the subject 
of Section II. 
Table 1 
BRAZILIAN SIZE DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME, ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE POPULATION, 1960 
AND 1970, VARIABLE INCOME BRACKETS 
Monthly income 
in 1960 NCr$ 
None 
0 ..; 2.1 
2.1 - 3.3 
3.3 - 4.5 
4.5 - 6.0 
6.0 - 10.0 
10.0 - 20.0 
20.0 - 50.0 
Over 50.0 
Mean {Current NCr$) 
Mean (1960 U.S. $ per year) 
Cini coefficient 
Monthly income 









2001 and over 
Mean (current NCr$) 




















































Source: Fishlow (1972, Tables 1 and 5) 
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II. A Re-examination 
The fundamental question underlying the analysis of income distribution 
in economic development is this: who (as classified by income class or other 
economic or socio-economic criterion) receives the proceeds of economic growth? 
The ideal way to answer this question would be to follow the same set of 
individuals over a period of time to see how their incomeschange and how 
these changes relate to their initial characteristics. While the type of 
longitudinal (or panel) data needed to do this have recently become available 
1for the United States, no similar data set exists for Brazil, nor to my 
knowledge for any other less developed country. In the absence of longitudinal 
data, we must rely on frequency distributions of the population by income 
class. Growth in favor of the rich at the expense of the poor would involve 
both (1) an increase in the number of persons in the highest income brackets, 
with a reduction in the number in the next lower income brackets, from which 
they presumably originated, and (2) an increase in the number of persons in 
the- -poorest categories, with a reduction in the number in the next higher in­
come brackets, from which they presumably originated. On the other hand, 
a pattern of economic growth which reaches the very poorest as well would 
involve (1) a reduction in the number of persons in the poorest income 
categories, and (2) an increased frequency in most, if not all, of the other 
income classes. 
To examine the data for Brazil, the figures presented in Tablel do not 
1
There are now three such data files in the United States: the Social 
Security LEED file, the University of Michigan panel study, and the National 
Longitudinal Study conducted at Ohio State University (commonly referred to 
as the Parnes data after the project\s director). 
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quite suffice, because they have different income brackets in the two 
years. Lacking the raw data with which to make an exact fit, it is necessarv 
to take the income brackets for one year as base and to approximate the 
frequency from the other year in each category. The actual distribution 
for 1960 and the approximate values for 1970 are shown in Table 2 and 
1Figure 1. 
Table 2 
BRAZILIAN SIZE DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME, ECONOMICALLY 
ACTIVE POPULATION, 1960 and 1970,COMPARABLE 
INCOME BRACKETS 
Monthlv income Percentage Percentage Cumulative Cumulative 
in 1960 NCr$ of population, of population, percentage percentage 




None 14.7% 11. 7% 14. 7% 11.7% 
0-2.1 22.3 23.8 37.0 35.5 
2.1-3.3 14.4 12.2 51.4 47.7 
3.3-4.5 10.5 11.0 61.9 58.6 
4.5-6.0 13.1 14.5 75,0 73.1 
6. 0-10. 0 13.8 9.4 88.8 82.5 
10.0-20.0 8.2 10.9 97.0 93.4 
20.0-50.0 2.6 5.0 99.6 98.4 
Over so.a o.s 1.6 100.1 100.0 
(;foi coefficient, 1960 = .59 
(;ini coefficient, 1970 = .63 
1The procedure used to approximate the 1970 distribution is the following. 
The mean incomes in 1960 and 1970 were $513 and 679 respectively, both measured 
in constant 1960 U.S. dollars. These same means, expressed in current NCr$ 
were 5,52 and 258.1. Thus, the ratio of the real means was 1.32, and of the 
nominal means 46.76. The ratio of these, 35.32 is then an inflation factor which 
can be used to deflate the 1970 brackets. For example, the first positive income 
bracket in 1970 runs from Oto 2.8 constant NCr$. Then, applying a linear 
approximation to the population frequency within each bracket, 2,1/2.8 of 
the population in the 0-2.8 category was assigned to the 0-2.1 category, and 
the remaining 0,7/2.8 was assigned to the next higher category. An analogous 
procedure was followed for the other brackets. It would, of course, have 
been better to have used the exact distrih11tion of the economically active 
population across thes~ income brackets rather than this approximation; but 
owing to the lack of a public use samplP for the microeconomic data, this was 
impossible. 
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The most striking feature of these data is that the cumulative per­
centage of population was lower in 1970 than in 1960 for every income hracket. 
This means, very simply, that economic growth which took place over the 
decade reached persons in all income levels, and not just those at the top. 
It should be observed that these figures refer to percentage of the 
population; with a growing population, these figures imply that the Brazilian 
economy was able to create opportunities for its economically active popu­
lation to earn higher incomes at a faster rate than its labor force was ex­
panding. These findings clearly refute the notion that the rich got absolutely 
richer while the poor got absolutely poorer in Brazil during the 1960s. 
The analysis may be extended to compare the income growth of the poorest 
groupswith that of all others. We may ask four related questions: 
(1) Defining "the poor" as those whose incomes were helow a constant 
real uoverty line, did the fraction of the economically active population de­
fined as "poor" increase or decrease over the decade? 
(2) What was the relative increase of incomes among the "poor" as 
opposed to the "non-poor"? 
(3) How much of the economic growth over the decade went to the 
11 poor" 
and how much to the "non-poor"? 
(4) Defining the "poverty gap" as the amount by which poor persons' 
incomes would have to be raised to bring them all up to the poverty line, how 
much of the gap was filled during the decade? 
We must begin by establishing a poverty standard. According to Fishlow, 
something like 31% of Brazilian families were poor in 1960 by Brazilian 
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d f
. . . 1 e 1n1t1ons. Since it is not possible to identify these families exactly, 
we may suppose that those persons in the two lowest income brackets, (i.e., 
less then 2.1 NCr$ constant), which in 1960 comprised 37.0% of the population, 
were below the poverty line. From now on, we will refer to these persons 
as '·'the poor" and the rest of the population as "the non-poor." 
Considering first the question of changing numbers of "poor", we see 
from Table 2 that there was a small decrease in the percentage of the economically 
active population with incomes below the poverty line, from 37.0% to 35.5%. 
While there was not a higher incidence of poverty in 1970 than in 1960 as 
might have been supposed by the rising inequality coefficients, neither was 
the incidence substantially reduced. 
Next, let us compare the rate of growth of incomes among "the poor" as 
opposed to "the non-poor". Using information about the fraction of the popu­
lation defined as "poor" and "non-poor" and the share of income accruing to 
each, we can determine the average income in each group in each year. Letting 
y and y be the mean incomes of the "poor" and "non-poor" respectively_ and 
P ·n 
P be the population, we have, for 1960, 
1The poverty line is defined according to Brazilian standards. Says 
Fishlow (1972, pp. 393-4): "The real minimum wage for 1960 in the Northeast, 
the poorest region, is taken as the lower· limit of acceptable income for a 
familv of 4.3 persons. For rural Brazil, the wage prevailing in the rural 
areas of the Northeast is taken; for the urban Northeast, the standard of 
the medium sized municipio is applied; and for all other unban residents, the 
Northeast level, increamented by 15 percent to allow for higher relative prices, 
i.s applied. The poverty line for different size families is defined with the 
aid of the elastid.ty of expenditure on food with respect to family size; 
because of economies of scale larger families need relatively ·less income, and 





and for 1970, 
70 70 70 70 70(3) 35.5% P ; + 64.5% P ; = (258.1/35.32)P and -p ·n 
7




(5) - 60 V··p = 0.8, -
70 











y n = 8.3, 
-70 
yn = 10.6, -70 -60 y - ynn---~= -60 28% 
yn 
From (5), we see that "the poor" became noticeably less poor. Further­
more, comparing (5) and (6), we see that the incomes of "the poor" grew at 
1 a rate double that of the "non-poor". This reinforces the earlier observation 
that the rich in Brazil did not benefit during the 1960s at the expense of 
the poor. 
1
Actually, this is an understatement, since some 4% of the "poor" (1.51'./37.0%) 
received large enough income increases to raise them above the poverty U.nc, 
and their incomes appear as "non-poor" incomes in the above calculati.ons. 
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Is the 1970 distribution of incomes between "poor" and "non-poor" 
more or less "equal" than the 1960 distribution? The answer to thi.s question 
depends on how one defines "equal." On the one hand, if absolute real 
income differentials are our standard, we observe 
-69 
- y = 7.5, = 9.3, 
p 
and we see that the absolute gap widened by about 25%. However, this gap 
was a smaller percentage of per capita income in 1970 than in 1960: 
-60 -60
(8) - y -70 -70yn p 7.5 yn - yp= --= 1. 36, = 9.3 = 1. 27,
-60 5.2 ...70 258.1/35.32Yp Yp 
Furthermore, if we take relative income ratios as our standard for comparison, 
we find 
(9) -60/-y60 = 10.4 , y 70 / y 70 = 8.2,Yn p n p 
that is, a reduction of the ratio of "non-poor" to "poor" incomes of about 
20%. Personally, I would give heavier weight to the income ratios, for two 
reasons. One is that in any economy in which poverty is being alleviated, 
the "ooor" can receive only limited income increases before they cross the 
povertythreshold and are no longer classified as "poor". Second, we are 
often inclined to think of income inequality in an economy in relative terms, 
independent of income levels, which implies the need to compare income 
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1
ratios rather than absolute income differentials. I would thus interpret 
thesE~ patterns as indicating a relative narrowing of the gap between "poor" 
and "non-poor" in Brazil, but others who give heavy weight to absolute in­
come differentials would disagree. 
Now let us address the question of how much of the economic growth over 
the decade went to "the poor" and how much to "the non-poor." Elsewhere 
(Fields (1975)), I have devised a methodology for decomposing 
total economic growth into four effects: 
= Enlargement of the high income sector 
= Change in the number of persons in the high income sector, 
multiplied by the income differential between the high income and 
low income sectors in the base year; 
0 = Enrichment of the high income sector 
= Change in income within the 'high income sector, multiplied by the 
number of persons in that sector in the base year; 
y = Interaction between enlargement and enrichment of the high income sector 
= Change in income within the high income sector, multiplied by the change 
in the number of persons in that sector; 
6 = Enrichment of the low income sector 
= Change in income within the low income sector, multiplied bv the 
number of persons in that sector in the terminal year. 
The specific formulas, and the numerical results for Brazilian economic 
9;rowth <luring the 1960s, are given in Table 3. 
1For an initial attempt to axiomatize static inequalitv measures, see 
Fields and Fei (1974). 
--------- - - -------------------
-13-
TABLE 3 
ANALYSIS OF ECONOMIC GROWTH IN BRAZIL AND THE UNITED 
STATES DURING THE 1960s 
Importance in the economic 
Effect Definition of Growth Of: 
Effect Brazil U.S.
1960-1970 1959-1%9 
a Enlargement of 
the "non-poor" 6% 19% 
population 
a Enrichment of
the "non-poor" 82% 72% 
population 
Interaction between





f70 10% 1%(y -
l5 of the "poor" p p 
population 
a +0sum of "poor"
enlargement
and enrich-
ment effect 16% 20% 
TOTAL 100% 100% 
where f = percentage of the population which was "poor"p 
f = percentage of the population which was ''non-poor''n 
average income of the "poor" populationyp = 
average income of the "non-poor" populationyn = 
continued on neKt page 
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Table 3 continued 
and 















































u.s.$10,774 -69 y = 
n 
u~s. 12,343 
Sources of data: Brazil--text 
United States--Statistical Abstract of the United States {1971), 
Tables 485, 512, 513, 515, 517. 




line = 2.1 A 
70 
y = 1.3 
·p 






l I ,_ ---------------------~~J;.,__- Percentage of 
35,5% 37.0% population 
= As60 60 60Poverty Gap in 1960 c n 
As70 
70 70
Poverty Gap in 1970 = c n 
Reduction in Poverty B70 B60 C60 C' 
= 
Gap Between 1960 and 1970 + D70 C70 C' D60 Source: See Text 
-15-
The outstanding result is that the bulk of economic growth in Brazil 
accrued to persons who had been above the poverty line in 1960. Of the total 
growth, only about 16% went to "the poor." Of this, six percentage points 
went to elevating formerly poor persons above the poverty line, while the 
other ten percentage points served to make "the poor" somewhat less poor. 
Before arriving at a qualitative judgment about this pattern, two 
considerations should be borne in mind. For one thing, it is not really 
surprising that most of the economic growth of a country would be received 
by the non-po_or. This is partly because higher income persons have superior 
access to income-earning opportunities; partly because many countries develop 
by creating more employment of professional and skilled workers, who are 
likely to have been earning above the poverty line to begin with; and partly 
because of the simple mathematical fact that the poor cannot receive a very 
large share of the income growth before they are no longer poor. In addition, 
if we compare the percentage of growth accruing to the "poor" in Brazil (16%) 
with the same figure for the United States for the same decade (20%), we find 
that the results are not very different, despite the reputation of the U.S. 
as a relatively more egalitarian society. Thus, the pattern observed for 
Brazil may be a bit more understandable. 
Finally, we may examine the extent to which the Brazilian economy closed 
its "poverty gap" during the 1960s. The poverty gap, is calculated as the 
sum of the differences between each poor person's (or family's) income and­
the poverty line. This concept may be illustrated with the aid of Figure 2. 
Poor persons in 1960, who comprised 37.0% of the population received an 
average income of NCr$0.8. The poverty gap then was: 
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(10) Poverty gap in 1960 
= (poverty line minus mean income of persons below the poverty 
line in 1960) 
X (Population below the poverty line) 
a ($2.1 - $0.8) x 37.0%P 
= 48.1% P, 
where Pis the economically active population, and is illustrated by the area 
AB60 c60 D6o. 
Similarly, for 1970, we have 
(11) Poverty gap in 1970 
= ($2.1 - $1.3) x 3S.S%P. 
= $28.4% P, 
given by area AB70c 70n 70 in Figure 2. Expressed as a percentage of population, 
the amount of the poverty gap made up during the 1960s is the sum of two 
components: that part of the increase in incomes which elevated some of the 
70 60 60 poor up to the poverty line (B B C C'), plus the increase in incomes of 
those who remained below the line 70(n70 c 1c n60). For Brazil between 1960 
and 1970, the amount made up was: 
(12) Poverty gap made up 
= (Gap between poverty line and mean income of "the poor" 
in 1960) x (Percentage of "poor" elevated above the poverty line) 
+ (Change in mean income of "the poor" between 1960 and 1970) 
x (Percentage of "poor" remaining poor) 
= [($2.1 - $0.8) x 1.5%PI+ [($1.3-0.8) x 3S.5%P] 
= $19.9%P. 
The percentage of the poverty gap made up in Brazil over the decade is the 
ratio of (12) to (10) or 41%. 
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Coincidentally, in the United States, the poverty gap was reduced by 
exactly the same percentage, 41%, over the same period, much of which com­
1
prised the "War on Poverty" years of the Johnson administration. Although 
the percentage reduction was the same in the two countries, their patterns 
differed noticeably, as may be seen from the following figures: 
Brazil United States 
1960-1970 1959-1969 
Percentage Reduction 
in Poverty Gap 41% 41% 
Percentage Reduction 
in Fraction "Poor" 5% 33% 
Percentage Reduction in Percentage 
Difference Between Average Income 
of "The Poor" and the Poverty Line 38% 20% 
Fraction of Poverty Gap Reduction 
Attributable to Smaller Fraction 10% 61% 
of Population Below the Poverty 
Line 
The differences may be illustrated by comparing Figures 2 and 3. 
We observe that in Brazil, the poverty gap reduction took the form of sub­
stantially raising the incomes of "the poer" while elevating relatively few 
above the poverty line. In the United States, in contrast, the fraction "poor" 
was reduced by one-third, but those who remained "poor" were helped relatively 
less by a decade of growth than in Brazil. 
1statistical abstract of the United States (1971, Table 517) 
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FIGURE 3 
POVERTY GAP IN THE UNITED STATES, 1959 AND 1969 
1969 dollars 
Poverty line A ... 
for family r 
of four= i 
$3,721 I 
I 
10 I 10 
D It------ ~------ .... C 














6O 6O 6Poverty Gap in 1959 = AB c D 0 
7O 7O 7Poverty Gap in 1969 = AB c D o 
B7o B6o c6o c 1
Reduction in Poverty 
= 
Gap Between 1960 and 1970 + D70 C70 C' 060 
Source: Statistical Abstract of the United States (1971), 
Tables 512, 513, 515, 517. 
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III. How it Happened 
How was the Brazilian economy able to shift its entire income distri­
bution and eliminate a considerable percentage of its poverty gap during a 
decade of growth? The basic dimensions of change are given in Table 4. 
We begin by observing that for three-quarters of that country's economi­
cally active population, wages were the only source of income, and the income 
received by wage-earners was 71% of the total. It follows, therefore, that 
the changing income distribution has its primary origin in a changing labor 
market. 
Sections Band C document the familiar notions that incomes are higher 
in urban than rural areas, and higher in industry than in agriculture. Thus, 
a shifting income distribution and reduction of poverty could result from 
the transfer of the population from rural agriculture to urban areas in general 
and to the industrial sector in particular. 
In Sections D-F, we see that that is just what happened. The urban popu­
lation grew nearly twice as fast as the total population and more than six 
times faster than the rural population, which can only be due to substantial 
rural-urban migration. Output in the industrial sector grew at an above­
average rate (96% opposed to an average of 79%) while agricultural sector 
output growth was below average (53%). The differences in employment growth 
are even more marked: 77% growth of the industrial sector, and only 9% in 
agriculture. 
The changing sectoral distribution of the labor force is reflected as 
well in the occupational distribution (Section F). The number of jobs at 
the lowest occupational levels (more or less the equivalent of unskilled, 
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menial labor) increased by just 2% over the decade, while the number of 
jobs at higher ,_evels doubled. Consequently, the importance of "primary 
jobs" fell from 54% to 43% of total employment. 
Finally, we may note that labor force participation increased over the 
decade, ~ue to dramatic increases in the employment of women in every age 
group. On the other hand, there were noticeable but relatively small de­
clines in employment rates for men, particularly the very young and very old. 
The increased employment of women is likely to represent an influx of pre-
viously underutilized human capital, with consequent increases in wage levels.
1 
What caused labor market conditions to change? During the 1960s Brazil 
shifted toward an export-promotion development strategy and away from a policy 
in many other less developed countries,of import-substitution, In Brazil as 
it is generally thought that import-substitution was accompanied by factor 
price distortions which •indered employment growth by favoring capital-in-
tensive techniques in manufacturing. 
2 The export-promotion phase, beginning 
in 1964, raised capital costs by means of monetary correction and lowered 
labor costs via wage controls. The expected result was more labor intensive 
production, which indeed took place (see Section I). The likely consequences 
1Recall that the income distribution figures presented above refer to 
It may be presumed that size distributionthe economically active population. 
of income among families became more equal (or less unequal) than the dis­
tribution among persons, insofar as many of these women are "secondary" 
workers" whose earnings supplement those of their husbands. 
2 But for a constrasting view of the labor absorption experience during 
the import substitution phase, see Morley and Williamson (1974). 
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of greater labor intensiveness on income distribution would be a) a 
narrowing of the wage structure, b) more employment of the previously-un­
employed, presumably at the lower occupational levels, but also c) more 
employment at higher levels, (i.e., a more unequal occupational struct.ur·e), 
and therefore the possibility of greater measured inequality, which we have 
observed. 
In summary, we may conclude that the changing income distribution in 
Brazil resulted largely from changing labor market conditions, in particular: 
(1) A relatively high rate of growth of output and employment in the 
relatively high-paying urban sector; 
(2) A relatively high rate of growth of output and employment in the 
relatively high-paying industrial sector; 
(3) A relative expansion of employment in "modern sector" occupations; 
(4) 6hanging labor force composition away from the very young and very 
old :i.n favor of prime-age women, who are apt to be more productive than those 
whom they replaced in the labor force. 
Furthermore, the changing labor market conditions seem in turn to have 




SOME ASPECTS OF BRAZILIAN ECONOMIC GROWTH 
DURING THE 1960s 
A. Income Source, 1970a 
Wage earners as percentage of income 
recipients 
Income received by wage-earners as 
percentage of total 
B. Median Earned inco~e by rural-ruban, 
1960 (approximate) 
Urban and suburban households 









E. Real output by sector 
1949 = lOOe 
Industrial 261.4 
Agriculture 156.1 
Total real product 205.7 
F. Employment by sector 
(in Millions) f 
Industrial 3.0 
Agriculture 12.2 
Total economically active 
population 22.6 
G. Employment by occupational 
type (in thousands)g 
Primary: agricultural 12,271 
activities, vegetable 































Secondary: Mineral extraction, 
industrial production and 
services, and construction 2,791 5,476 96% 
Terciary: Professionals, sellers 
of services (including repairmen 
and domestic workers), merchants, 
transport and communication workers 
and civil servants 
and army) 
(including police 
5,341 11,082 107% 
H. Rate of EmEloyment as Eercentage 
of po~ulation in Each Age-Sex 
Group 1960 1969 
Men 
15-19 72.4% 68.2% 
20-24 92.3 89.3 
25-34 97.2 96.0 
35-44 96.9 95.8 
45-54 94.0 92.5 
55-64 83.2 81.5 
65 + 59.1 51.4 
Men 15 and over 88.6% 84.8% 
Women 
15-19 23.4% 37.4% 
20-24 22.5 41.7 
25-34 17.8 36. 3 
35-44 17.1 34. 2 
45-54 15.6 31.0 
55-64 12.6 22.7 
65 + 8.5 10.0 
Women 15 and over """""fs.""4% 33.6% 
I. Employment/output ratio 
by sector )t 
1960 1968-70 % change 
Agriculture 2.27 2.50 +10% 
Industry .52 .63 +20% 
Services .49 .68 +38% 
Notes to Table 4: 
a) Comision Economica para America e) Fundacao Getulio Vargas (1973),
Latina (1974), p. 22 Table 2 
b) Brasil (1960) , Table 6 f) Brasil (1970), Table V
c) Brasil (1970), Table 8 g) Singer (1971), Tables 2JV, 2.VI
d) Brasil (1960), Table 1 and h) Singer (1971), Table I.I 
Brasil (1970), Table 1 i) Wogart (1974), Table 6 
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IV. Conclusions 
The conventional wisdom concerning Brazilian economic development over 
the 1960-1970 period may be summarized by three propositions: 
(1) The absolute rate of growth was very high. 
(2). Income distribution worsened over the period. 
(3) Significant social and political costs were paid. 
As a result, many writers have questioned whether the higher rate of economic 
growth was "worth it." 
Without addressing the issue of social and political costs and accepting 
the finding that aggregate growth was very rapid over the decade, this paper 
has re-examined the income distributional consequences of _Brazilian economic 
development over the 1960s. Among the findings are the following: 
(1) The entire income distribution shifted, benefiting every income class. 
(2) There was a small decline in the fraction of the economically active 
population classified as below the poverty line, but those who remained "poor" 
received markedly higher incomes. 
(3) The percentage increase in incomes for those below the poverty line 
was more than double that of those above the poverty line. 
(4) The relative income gap between "poor" and "non-poor" persons 
narrowed in terms of ratios but widened absolutely. 
(5) The bulk of the income growth over the decade accrued to persons 
above the poverty line. However, a similar pattern is observed for the 
United States, an allegedly more egalitarian society. 
(6) The poverty gap in Brazil was reduced by 41% between 1960 and 1970. 
The United States reduced its poverty gap by exactly the same percentage 
over the same decade, 
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(7) The patterns of production and employment in the Brazilian economy 
shifted over the decade in favor of the relatively advanced and high-paying 
sectors: urban areas, the industrial sector, and relatively high-level 
occupations. 
These findings cast considerable doubt on the convent•i'()nal wisdom 
concerning the distributional consequences of Brazilian economic growth. 
At minimum, the notion that "the rich got rich at the expense of the poor" 
receives no support in the data examined here. Furthermore, while the very 
richest (i.e., top 5%) benefited over the decade, we :also see that in several 
respects, the "poor" benefited relative to the "non-poor." We· might conclude 
by asking a qualitative question: despite a rising share of income going 
to the very richest and rising Gini coefficient, did the Brazilian size 
1
distribution of income really worsen? 
1After completing the draft of this paper, I learned that Morley and 
Williamson (1974) have also questioned whether a rising Gini coefficient 
really signifies reduced social welfare. Their observation pertains to 
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